# In the Shadow of Conflict: How Emotions and Past Victimization Influence Foreign Policy Attitudes[1]

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## Abstract

We investigate how emotions and past violence influence foreign policy attitudes via a survey experiment in Georgia. Using a stratified sample across areas with differential exposure to the conflict and the presence of internally displaced persons, we randomly assign respondents to receive emotional primes about Russian aggression in the region. We find that exposure to violence, as well as simply being reminded about Russian increase the perceived threat from Russia, and to a lesser extent anger towards Russia. Individuals who receive the primes are more supportive of a hardline foreign policy. We also find that exposure to violence increases support for a hardline foreign policy indirectly, through increased anger and threat.

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## Section 1 Motivation

One of the most salient aspects of conflict is the psychological and emotional effects on those victimized. As one Syrian father noted about the effect of Syrian Civil War violence on his son, "(he) wakes up afraid in the middle of the night. He wakes up screaming. …A child was slaughtered in front of him, so he started to dream that someone is coming to slaughter him?"[4] The lingering effects of wartime violence on increased trauma and stress are well documented and do not end with the cessation of hostilities (Steel et al., 2009). Further, research suggests that the effects of violence and political conflict can have intergenerational consequences that can last far beyond the end of the hostilities (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012, Acharya et al. 2016).

Conflict also changes underlying political dynamics, and how individuals view politics. Attitudes on justice and potential for reconciliation are shaped by their previous experiences during the conflict. For instance, one victim of displacement by the Colombian FARC rebels who opposed an amnesty deal between the Colombian government and the rebels stated, "the FARC are a bunch of assassins and jail is the very least the guerrillas should get for all the suffering they have caused to so many people. Without that, there's no peace."[5] Recent research backs up this anecdote that conflict can harden political attitudes in the context of intergroup conflict (Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2014).

[4] Save the Children http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/03/07/invisible_wounds.pdf

[5] See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-idUSKCN10Z0I4?il=0

In the context of ongoing, or intractable conflicts, attitudes towards the conflict become the main axis of political competition (Bar-Tal 2000). In particular scholars have looked at two related phenomena: 1) the effects of exposure to violence, and 2) how emotions influence political behavior. Being exposed to violence can increase political participation (Blattman 2009, Bateson 2012), and altruism (Zeitzoff 2014, Bauer et al. 2016). However, it has also been found to increase hardline political attitudes (Canetti et al 2009, Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014). Emotions in the context of intergroup conflict are particularly effective at motivating and shaping political attitudes and behavior. With threat perception and anger likely to increase negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Huddy et al. 2005, Young 2016).

To understand what influences political attitudes in the shadow of conflict it is necessary to disentangle the effects of past violence. Yet many of the previous cited studies papers use aggregate-level data (e.g., villages, municipalities, etc.) and look at how exposure changes aggregate outcomes (e.g., votes, political attitudes). In these papers the effect of individual exposure is assumed to be constant, i.e., "people got mad, or afraid and now vote or support x." Others that do look at individual exposure and political behavior, [6] generally observe exposure to violence, and some downstream outcome (such as political preferences, voting behavior, altruism, etc.), but do not directly test the psychological mechanisms, in particular emotions. Even

[6] See Bauer et al. (2016) for a nice review

those scholars that do look at emotions generally do so via mediation and not by directly manipulating them.[7]

Georgia represents an ideal case to explore the effects of different emotions and exposure to violence on foreign policy attitudes for three reasons. First foreign policy and security issues are extremely salient. Georgia has faced numerous episodes of violence since its independence in 1991. It has fought a series of conflicts with Russian-backed separatists and with Russia (2008), over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, that has led to over 230,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the conflicts. Second there is considerable geographic and individual variation in exposure to violence and threat perception, with IDP settlements and areas closer to Ossetia and Abkhazia facing higher exposure and threat. Finally Georgia's military is much weaker compared to Russia's. Unlike individuals in comparatively stronger military states, Georgians must weigh their desire for an aggressive foreign policy, against the possibility of provoking Russia.[8]

We explore how emotions and victimization influence foreign policy attitudes via a survey experiment conducted in Georgia in October and November of 2015. For our

[7] A few notable exceptions include Zeitzoff (2014), Callen et al. (2014), Young (2016), and Zeitzoff (2017). Yet none of these studies explicitly focuses on foreign policy attitudes.

[8] https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-poll-georgians-increasingly-support-eu-and-euro-atlantic-aspirations-view-russia

survey experiment we stratify on the presence of IDPs and across different regions of Georgia that experienced different degrees of exposure to past-violence from the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In our survey experiment we randomly assigned people to one of four treatments: 1) a pure control condition (Control); 2) a prime people about past and current Russian aggressive actions in the region (Pure Information Treatment); 3) a prime about past and current Russian aggressive actions designed to elicit anger about Russian actions (Anger Treatment); and 4) a prime about past and current Russian aggressive actions designed to elicit fear about it (Fear Treatment). Following the manipulation we had subjects answer questions related to their level of threat and anger at Russian actions in the region, support for Georgia joining the NATO—which is viewed as a provocative step by Russia,[9] and willingness to recognize an independent South Ossetia and Abkhazia in exchange for reducing tensions with Russia.

We find that simply reminding respondents about Russian aggression (receiving the Fear, Anger, or Pure Information treatments) leads Georgians to view Russia as more threatening, and slightly more angry. It also leads respondents to be more in favor of a hardline foreign policy—supportive of Georgia joining NATO, and less supportive of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Finally, IDPs and those exposed to past

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nato-and-the-eu-desert-georgia/2016/06/16/20f2c7dc-33be-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html?utm_term=.52a89962fe68

violence are more likely to view Russia as threatening and are angry at Russian actions in the region. Mediation result suggest that the effect of violence on policy attitudes (Georgia joining NATO, or independence for Abkhazia or South Ossetia) is indirect via threat and anger. Our findings provide evidence that emotions about conflict, and victimization have distinct effects on attitudes. They further suggest that reminders of past violence can serve as a catalyst for support for more aggressive foreign policies, and are a potential mechanism for the continuation of conflict, even in states such as Georgia that are facing threats from much stronger adversaries.

**Section 2 Russian-Georgian Tensions**

Since Georgian independence in 1991, Russia-Georgia relations have been tense due to Russia's support for the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The key explanation for Russian actions in Georgia is Russia's concern over Georgia's increasing closeness to NATO. Russia views post-Soviet space (often qualified as 'near abroad' in Russian political parlance) as part of its 'privileged interest' and threatened by any cooperation between NATO and post-Soviet republics (Cameron and Orenstein, 2012). NATO's expansion into these areas is viewed as a primary security threat to Russia.[10]

[10] http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768

The origins of current Russia-Georgian tensions can be traced back to Georgian independence. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the former Soviet dissident and first President elected in 1991, distinguished himself with his strong anti-Russian stance, marginalizing of non-Georgian minorities, and authoritarian rhetoric (Jones 2004). In 1992 Gamsakhurdia fell victim to a coup d'état organized by leaders of paramilitary groups, who then installed former Soviet foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in power (Driscoll 2015). While Shevardnadze incorporated Georgia in the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, Russian support toward separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not abate. In response Shevardnadze's foreign policy became increasingly pro-Western. In 1999 Georgia became member of Council of Europe and joined NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP). The reformist wing of Shevardnadze's elite, including future Rose Revolution leaders, Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili, were especially in favor of pro-Western policies.

In November 2003, a series of anti-incumbent protests known as the Rose Revolution, led by the young, American-educated former Justice Minister Mikheil Saakashvili, toppled Shevardnadze's regime. Yet even with the Western orientation of the Saakashvili-led government, Georgia and Russia were able to peacefully resolve the political crisis in the autonomous Georgian region Adjara in 2004.[11] Relations soured once it became clear that membership in the European Union and NATO were

[11] http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan018787.pdf

Saakashvili's key foreign policy goals. Georgian political elites increasingly emphasized Russia's 'otherness,' and argued that Georgia's more natural alliance was with Western and European civilization.[12] In 2006 Russia imposed trade embargo on Georgia and expelled a large numbers of Georgian labor immigrants in Russia.[13] Tensions culminated in 2008 when Georgia lost the 5-day long war with Russia over the control of South Ossetia (2008 Russo-Georgian War). Following the war, and the increasing Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia was increasingly framed as an occupier by President Sakaasshvili, and not simply a threatening neighbor. Yet, the Georgian public remained less hawkish than Sakaashvili's government. A 2010 NDI poll showed 49 percent of public disapproved (as opposed to 38 percent approved) of Saakashvili's foreign policy toward Russia.[14]

Since Sakaashvili's party was voted out of office in October 2012, anti-Russian rhetoric has decreased, but Georgia has kept integration with the West as its top foreign policy priority.[15] Support for integration into NATO and EU is still strong. For example according to August 2015 public opinion poll 69 percent of respondents

[12] http://www.parliament.ge/files/292_880_927746_concept_en.pdf

[13] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/06/AR2006040601894.html

[14] https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Survey-Results-0411.pdf

[15] In 2014 Association membership plan with the EU was signed.

approved of Georgian government's stated goal of joining NATO[16] and 58 percent thought that Georgia should join European Union.[17] However attitudes towards Russia amongst the population are mixed. According to a 2016 IRI survey, even though 71 percent considered Russia to be country's biggest threat, 59 percent strongly supported further dialogue with Russia,[18] and 70 percent preferred Russia as a main economic partner.[19]

Georgian attitudes towards Russia are wrapped up in attitudes towards the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia broke out in the immediate aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Conflicts between the central government in Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia stemmed from the different views on the political status of the autonomous republics. Underlying these tensions, ethnic Ossetians and Abkhaz were alienated and threatened by Gamsakhurdia's nationalistic policies following Georgian independence (Cornell 2002, George 2009). Gamsakhurdia's counterproductive

[16] The range of support is within 60 to 80 percent of respondents since June 2012 being at its highest point of 81 percent in November 2013

[17] https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Winter%20poll_2015_Public%20presentation_ENG_version%20FINAL_0.pdf

[18] http://www.iri.org/resource/iri%E2%80%99s-center-insights-poll-georgians-maintain-pro-western-attitudes-face-russian-threat

[19] http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2016/07/who-should-georgias-closest-economic.html

policies radicalized South Ossetian's stance vis-a-vis Tbilisi but Abkhazia conflict is better explained as an outcome of long-standing grievances and historically rooted fear and distrust of Tbilisi (Oskanian 2013). The War in Abkhazia (1992-1993) claimed more than 25,000 lives, while 1991-1992 South Ossetia War resulted in 1,000 civilian and military casualties (Derluguian 1998 p. 263). The conflicts displaced large numbers of civilians, many former ethnic Georgian residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Including the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, there are more than 230,000 IDPs, out of a total population of only 4.5 million (the exact figures of IDPs remain contested). Since their displacement in the early 1990s and again in 2008, the Georgian government has pursued a goal of 'integration and return.'[20] The Georgian government has used the right of return for ethnic Georgian IDPs as both a promise, and as a threat to "demographic(ally) re-conquest" Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Toal and Grono 2011 p. 656). After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War the possibility that Abkhazia and South Ossetia may never return to Georgia became widely accepted among the IDPs.[21]

[20] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/From-Responsibility-to-Response-Nov-2011doc.pdf

[21] http://www.cr.org/downloads/Displacement%20in%20Georgia_An%20Analysis%20of%20Survey%20Findings_201104_ENG.pdf

Before 2004 the conflicts in Abkhazia could be largely thought of as 'frozen conflicts' with Russian-brokered ceasefire and little progress on negotiations on conflict resolution (O'Loughlin et al. 2014).. Since the Rose Revolution of 2003 the conflicts became 'unfrozen' as Saakashvili government started to work actively to reintegrate these territories in Georgia proper. The policies were based but not limited to cracking down on smuggling through the conflict zones[22], promoting alternative politicians opposing de-facto authorities[23], initiating infrastructure development projects in and around these territories as means of alluring Abkhaz and Ossetian residents.[24] However these policies could not prevent all-out-war in August 2008. Following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the Georgian government has increasingly lobbied for using the term of 'Russian occupation,' as Russian troops increased military presence in these territories and they patrol the South Ossetian and Abkhazian borders. Before the August 2008 the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were characterized as ethnic conflicts (between Georgians and Abkhazians and Georgians and Ossetians) and at least partially (if not entirely) incited by Russian policies. After August 2008, the discussion of ethnic dynamics has substantially decreased and the conflict has been reframed strictly into Russia-Georgia standoff. Since 2008 Russia is listed as number one threat in official documents issued by Georgian government (Minesashvili 2016). 'Aggressor,' 'occupant' and 'threat to

[22] http://www.eurasianet.org/georgia/shida/story.html

[23] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15547

[24] http://www.civil.ge/files/files/GeorgianGovernmentReportWar.pdf

Georgian statehood' and 'threat to the very meaning of Georgianness' are the common ways Georgian politicians describe Russia (Naskidashvili and Kakhishvili 2016).

Finally, it is important to note that Georgians have closely followed Russian actions in the Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea (March 2014) and Russian actions in the Donbass (April 2014-present). Many commentators have noted the similarities in the tactics used by Russia in Ukraine, and those they employed in the 2008 conflict with Georgia, (e.g., rapid deployment of forces, misinformation, and use of cyber campaigns).[25] More broadly, Russian actions in Ukraine have only heightened the threat felt by Georgia and other former-Soviet countries from a resurgent Russia.[26]

**Section 3 Exposure to Violence, Emotions, and Foreign Policy**

International relations (IR) scholars have tended to focus on structural factors that shape the outbreak, duration, and dynamics of conflict (Fearon 1995, Schultz 1999, Powell 1999, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus explanations for conflict have focused on macro-level factors such as ethnic balance of power, and economic or opportunistic mechanisms (Blattman and Miguel 2010,

[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/crimea-crisis-may-seem-like-georgia-russia-situation-of-2008-but-its-really-not/2014/03/02/39db1890-a242-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html?utm_term=.2f06eb680a35

[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/europe/in-russias-frozen-zone-a-creeping-border-with-georgia.html?_r=0

Cedermann et al. 2010). Yet many IR theories of conflict implicitly rely on micro-level processes, in particular describing individual motivations to support or participate in conflict (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Kertzer 2017). An important factor finding by conflict scholars is that past legacies of violence weigh heavily on present-day attitudes (Horowitz 2001, Voigtländer and Voth 2012, Archya et al. 2016). In the context of perceived intractable conflict, or during periods of uncertainty, past or current intergroup conflicts can become a focal rallying point for individuals or leaders, and define the central political cleavage in a society (Bar-Tal 2000, Petersen 2002). Many times elites and political entrepreneurs strategically emphasize this history of violence for their own political gain (Gagnon 1996, de Figueiredo and Weingast 1997, Tilly 2003, Wilkinson 2006). In periods of instability, or when adversarial groups or neighboring actors are engaged in (perceived) threatening behavior, elites can use these legacies of violence to further underscore the threat faced by ingroup members (Posen 1993). Thus, past violence shapes how actors view and understand the current threat, which determines their susceptibility to past reminders of threat (Lake and Rothcild 1996). Feelings of threat are likely to be even more acute among groups or countries facing stronger adversaries (e.g., Georgia versus Russia) (Gvalia et al. 2013).

Reminders of past violence are not only the only way in which violence influences present-day attitudes. Exposure to the violence itself also plays a crucial role. It affects political attitudes, and at a more basic level, the way people think and behave. Individuals exposed to violence are more risk-accepting and more altruistic (Whitt

and Wilson 2007, Voors et al. 2012, Callen et al. 2012, Gilligan et al. 2014, Zeitzoff 2014, Bauer et al. 2016). It also makes individuals more likely to participate politically (Blattman 2009, Bateson 2012). Yet this altruism does not necessarily extend to outgroup members, with findings suggest that exposure to violence increases discrimination (Bauer et al. 2014, Zeitzoff 2017), and can also lead individuals to favor more hardline policies (Hersh 2013, Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014, Grossman et al. 2015). Overall, violence is thought to reduce support for compromise.

Yet what are the mechanisms by which past violence and conflicts influence present-day attitudes and conflicts? How are elites able to mobilize people with these appeals? Increasingly, emotions are recognized as powerful factors in shaping political attitudes and ethnic conflict (McDermott, 2004, Albertson and Gadarian, 2015). Leaders and political entrepreneurs use emotions strategically to draw support for their policy (McDermott 2010). This type of strategic use of emotions is even stronger in the context of intergroup conflict and threat. Two emotions that many argue are central to understanding conflict are anger and fear (Bar-Tal et al. 2007, Young 2016). Both are considered core negative emotions, but they are hypothesized to have very different subsequent behavioral tendencies (Frijda 1988, Lerner and Keltner 2001). Anger is considered an action-oriented emotion, reducing risk perceptions, and increasing taking action to reconcile the cause of anger. Conversely, fear increases risk perception, and causes respondents to avoid the cause of fear (Lerner et al. 2003, Young 2016).

Furthermore, research by political psychologists, suggests that threat perception is a key component in how individuals make decisions on foreign policy. Huddy et al. (2005) show that increased threat perception, which is distinct from anxiety and fear, increases support for harsh terror policies.[27] Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2014) in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict further show that exposure to violence increases psychological distress, which in turn increases threat perception. Using mediation they tie this increase in threat perception to increased militancy and reduced support for compromise. Exposure to violence is likely to increase feelings of threat from outgroups (Riek et al., 2006), and reduce support for compromise.

The extant literature suggests that emotions and past exposure to violence are important mechanisms that shape foreign policy. Our paper tests three related important implications and gaps in this literature. 1) Does priming anger and fear over past violence lead to distinct attitudes? 2) Are the effects of these emotional primes different from the effect of exposure to violence? 3) Finally, how do emotional primes and exposure influence anger and threat perception, and in turn how do these influence support for aggressive foreign policy attitudes?

In the context of Georgia we hypothesize that those with higher levels of exposure to violence will feel more angry and threatened by Russia, and also favor more hardline foreign policy towards Russia, and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and

[27] They "regard anxiety as an umbrella term for fear, anxiety, worry and related states" (p. 595).

Abkhazkia. We further hypothesize that emotional reminders about past violence may have differential effects. Those who are reminded about past and present Russian actions and primed to feel anger (Anger Treatment) will likely favor a harsher line on Russia, and less prone to reconcile with and recognize Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence (relative to the Fear Treatment and the Pure Information Treatment). Finally, we also expect that perceptions of threat will have a distinct effect from anger on foreign policy attitudes, with those who feel more threatened more likely to favor a hardline foreign policy.[28]

**Section 4 Survey Design and Summary Statistics**

The survey was carried between October and November of 2015 by the Caucasus Research Resource Center in Georgia (CRRC), a prominent research center that carries out the annual Caucasus Barometer survey.[29] We were particularly interested in how exposure to past violence and emotions influence foreign policy attitudes. Hence our sample was designed to achieve geographic exposure to violence. We sampled across three geographic regions (strata): 1) Tbilisi, the capital and largest

[28] Note some of our hypotheses differ slightly from pre-registration. For a full list of our pre-registered hypotheses, see the Online Appendix. See Miguel et al. (2014) and the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP) website (http://egap.org/) for a full discussion of the benefits of pre-registration.

[29] http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/datasets/

city, 2) Kutaisi, the third largest city in Georgia, and the location of the Georgian Parliament, and 3) those areas that were affected by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war (Conflict Affected). Our sample was further restricted to ethnic Georgians.[30] Within each of these regions, we further oversampled areas that included settlements. It is important to note that while our sample is representative within our given strata and PSUs, our sample was explicitly not nationally representative. Rather, our sample was designed to efficiently get variation in exposure to conflict (IDPs and conflict-affected areas). Further discussion of our sample is contained in the Appendix (Table A.1 and Figure A.1).

Respondents were surveyed face-to-to face. As part of a larger survey on political and corruption attitudes,[31] respondents were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions: a 1) pure control condition (Control); 2) a reminder about past and current Russian aggression (Pure Information Treatment); 3) a reminder about past and current Russian aggression designed to induce fear (Fear Treatment), and 4) a reminder about past and current Russian aggression designed to induce anger (Anger Treatment). Two important points about the treatment should be emphasized. First,

[30] We did this for two reasons--1) Georgia is 86.8% ethnic Georgian, and 2) many of the ethnic Azeris (6.3%) or Armenians (4.5%) are concentrated in southern regions not affected directly by the conflicts.

[31] We also conducted another survey experiment, examining attitudes towards corruption. Controlling for these previous treatments in this separate experiment does not influence any of our main results.

the Anger and Fear Treatments explicitly build on the Pure Information Treatment, by including the same information about current and past Russian actions in the region, but also include an emotional induction, "Please describe and tell us what most makes you ANGRY/AFRAID about Russia's actions." Second, these emotion inductions are designed to induce the targeted emotion, and have been used extensive in psychology, political science, and economics (Callen et al. 2014, Searles and Mattes 2015, Myers and Tingley 2016, Albertson and Gadarian 2016, Young, 2016, Zeitzoff 2017). The full wording of the treatments can be found in the Appendix.

Following the treatments, we then asked respondents their attitudes towards our five key dependent variables: 1) how much they consider Russia a threat to Georgia (Russia is a Threat); 2) how angry Russia's (foreign policy) actions make them (Russia Angry); 3) whether they think Georgia should join NATO even if Russia threatens Georgia (Georgia Should Join NATO); 4) whether to reduce tensions with Russia Georgia should recognize an independent South Ossetia (Recognize South Ossetia); and 5) whether Georgia should recognize an independent Abkhazia (Recognize Abkhazia).

Given the role that psychological orientations have been shown to play in foreign policy (Kertzer et al. 2014, Rathbun et al. 2016) we also measured individuals level of stress (Stress) and adherence to the a culture of honor (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). Previous research has found that partisanship is an important determinant of foreign policy attitudes (Berinsky 2007, Holsti 2009), so we also control for whether they

support former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Sakaashvili still remains a polarizing figure in Georgia politics, and support for him largely defines present-day foreign policy cleavages in Georgian politics (i.e., pro-Sakaashvili/European/Western versus anti-Sakaashvili/pro-Russian) (Saakashvili Support).[32]

Part of our key research questions is to understand how exposure to violence influences foreign policy attitudes. We measured exposure violence in several ways. We compare individuals with official IDP to status to those without IDP status (IDP). We also look at whether respondents knew someone who was murdered in Abkhazia or South Ossetia (Known Murder/Knew Someone Murdered). To get more fine-grain measures of exposure, we also created an index that summed whether individuals personally witnessed violence, were assaulted, extorted, knew someone who was murdered, etc. from the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Total War Exposure). We also disaggregated exposure by whether it came from South Ossetia (South Ossetia Exposure) or Abkhazia (Abkhazia Exposure). We also include region fixed effects, by controlling for whether the respondent lived in Conflict Affected region (one of our key regions), or from Kutaisi (with Tbilisi being the base category). A full list of the variables and how they are measured is shown in the Appendix.

[32] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/world/europe/georgia-dream-party-wins-election.html

| | Min. | Max. | Mean | SD | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDP | 0 | 1 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 1221 |
| Kutaisi | 0 | 1 | 0.40 | 0.49 | 1223 |
| Conflict Affected Area | 0 | 1 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 1223 |
| Total War Exposure | 0 | 1 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 1220 |
| South Ossetia Exposure | 0 | 1 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 1220 |
| Abkhazia Exposure | 0 | 1 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 1223 |
| Know Someone Murdered | 0 | 1 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 1205 |
| Stress | 0 | 1 | 0.48 | 0.23 | 1177 |
| Honor | 0 | 1 | 0.81 | 0.19 | 1067 |
| Saakashvili Support | 0 | 1 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 1091 |
| Education | 0 | 8 | 5.27 | 1.39 | 1221 |
| Respondent's Age | 18 | 93 | 49.01 | 17.93 | 1223 |
| Male | 0 | 1 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 1223 |
| Married | 0 | 1 | 0.61 | 0.49 | 1223 |
| Household Spending | 1 | 8 | 3.01 | 1.45 | 1116 |

Panel A: Independent Variables

| | Min. | Max. | Mean | SD | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russia is a Threat | 0 | 1 | 0.66 | 0.29 | 1129 |
| Russia Angry | 0 | 1 | 0.59 | 0.27 | 1152 |
| Georgia Join NATO | 0 | 1 | 0.54 | 0.29 | 955 |
| Recognize Abkhazia | 0 | 1 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 1140 |
| Recognize South Ossetia | 0 | 1 | 0.17 | 0.23 | 1139 |

Panel B: Dependent Variables

Table 1: Summary Statistics




Figure 1: Distribution of Perceptions of Threat and Anger Towards Russia.




Figure 2: Distribution of Attitudes on Foreign Policy Preferences.

Table 1 (Panel A) presents the summary statistics for the independent variables. By design, about a third of our sample is from Conflict Affected areas, and a third of our sample is from Kutaisi and Tbilisi. We also oversampled IDPs, who make up a third of our sample as well.[33] Slightly over half of our respondents are Sakaashvili supporters.

Figures 1 and 2, and Table 1 (Panel B) further shows that there is a fair amount of variation across our dependent variables.[34] In terms of emotions and threat perception, our average respondents view Russia as a very serious threat and are angry to very angry about Russia's actions. In terms of policy, on average Georgians are supportive of Georgia joining NATO. Conversely, they are strongly opposed to recognizing both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent from Georgia, even if it were to reduce tensions with Russia.[35]

**Section 5 Main Results**

Our analysis proceeds as follows. We first explore the relationship between anger towards Russia (Russia Angry), perceptions of threat (Russia Threat), and policy attitudes (joining NATO, recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent and

[33] See Table A.4.1 in the Appendix, the correlation between conflict-affected areas and IDPs is 0.35.

[34] All dependent variables are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1.

[35] Attitudes towards South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence are highly correlated (0.94).

show that they are positively correlated. We then examine how exposure to violence and our treatments influence perceptions of threat and anger towards Russia. Next, we examine the effects of exposure to violence and our treatments on policy attitudes. Additionally, we examine whether IDPs and non-IDPs respond differently to our treatments. Finally, we explore how past violence and our treatments effects on policy attitudes are mediated via anger towards and perceptions of threat of Russia.

All of our regressions are OLS with standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (PSU) voting precinct-level. Our base regressions just include dummy variables to estimate average treatment effects (ATE). Some regressions control for geographic region (Kutaisi and Conflict Affected areas), partisanship (Saakashvili support), explore various ways of measuring exposure to violence (IDP status, Total War Exposure, Known Murder, South Ossetia Exposure, and Abkhazia Exposure), and include controls (Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending). To allow comparison of effect sizes, all of our key dependent variables and independent variables have been rescaled to lie between 0 and 1. While most of our results are presented graphically, additional regression tables can be found in the Appendix, and robustness checks in the Online Appendix.

### 5.1 Relationship Between Emotions and Attitudes

Previous research has found that emotions and threat, particularly anger are powerful drivers of foreign policy attitudes. In Table 2 we see whether anger towards

Russia and perceptions of threat of Russia are correlated with policy attitudes. Columns 1-3 look at the correlations between anger and threat and joining NATO, columns 4-6 recognizing Abkhazia, and columns 7-9 recognizing South Ossetia. Since anger and threat, as well as policy attitudes, are all measured post-treatment (in that they were measured after respondents received our treatment), we also examine the correlation for only those respondents that were assigned to the treatment condition (columns 3, 6, and 9).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia |
| Russia is a Threat | 0.17*** | 0.17*** | 0.18** | 0.05 | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| Russia Angry | 0.15*** | 0.16*** | 0.16 | -0.28*** | -0.27*** | -0.21** | -0.30*** | -0.29*** | -0.24*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.10) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.09) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.09) |
| Observations | 903 | 820 | 218 | 1043 | 954 | 266 | 1043 | 955 | 263 |
| $R^2$ | 0.084 | 0.089 | 0.105 | 0.078 | 0.086 | 0.056 | 0.092 | 0.099 | 0.065 |
| Controls | | Yes | | | Yes | | | Yes | |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 2: Correlations between Emotions and Support for Different Policies. Note that columns 3, 6, and 9 are those that only in the control condition.

Table 2 shows that anger (Russia Angry) and threat perceptions (Russia is a Threat) are strongly, and positively correlated with support for joining NATO (columns 1-3). This echoes previous findings that anger and threat can lead to a harder-line foreign policy. Our findings hold even if when we only examine the control condition (column 3). Conversely, when examining attitudes recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (columns 4-9), we find that perceptions of threat from Russia are only weakly positively correlated with attitudes on independence. In contrast, anger is strongly positively correlated with harder-line attitudes against independence. This suggests that different foreign policies potentially have different emotional antecedents.

Table 2 establishes that anger and threat perception of Russia are related to policy attitudes. We further have shown that anger and threat represent distinct effects when thinking about different policy options (i.e., joining NATO versus recognition of independence of the separatist regions). In the subsequent sections we further disentangle the relationship between anger, threat, and policy attitudes. We look at how exposure to violence and our treatments influence anger and perceptions of threat, and also how influence these key policy attitudes.

### 5.2 Effect of the Treatments and Exposure on Anger and Threat

We first explore two key interrelated questions: how do reminders about past violence (our treatments), and actual exposure to violence influence perception of threat and anger?

In Figure 3 we present results on the effects of our treatments on perceptions of Russia's threat to Georgia (Russia Threat) and their anger at Georgia (Russia Angry). The plots on the left hand side are without controls, and those on the right include controls. Contrary to our hypotheses, the Anger Treatment is not statistically different from the Fear Treatment or the Pure Information Treatment.[36] In fact all our treatments, especially the Pure Information Treatment increase perceived threat relative to the Control Condition both with and without controls. In the bottom panel of Figure 3, we collapse the Fear, Anger, and Pure Information treatments into a dummy variable (Any Treat). The effects are positive and statistically significant. The effect of receiving any one of the three treatments on perceptions of threat is as large as partisanship (being a Sakaashvili supporter in Tables 3 and 4 in the Online Appendix).

We also examine the effect of the treatments on respondents' anger towards Russia's foreign policy actions in Figure 3 (Russia Angry). Here are our findings are weaker. Again we find no statistical difference between the Anger, Fear, or Pure Information Treatments. They all modestly increase anger levels, but the effects are not as strong as increased threat perception. The same is true when we collapse the treatments to a single dummy variable (Any Treat).

[36] Across all the regressions, the Anger Treatment, Fear Treatment, and Pure Information Treatment are not statistically different from each other.

In Figure 4 we examine how different measures of exposure to violence are related to anger towards and threat perception of Russia. No matter how we measure exposure to violence, all of our exposure measures are associated with higher perceptions of threat (Russia Threat) and to a lesser extent anger (Russia Angry) towards Russia. Whether comparing IDPs to non-IDPs (IDP), knowing someone who was murdered in South Ossetia or Abkahzia, (Known Murder), or looking at an index of violence exposure across the conflict (Total War Exposure), they all increase perceptions of threat, and marginally anger.

In sum, the effects are strong and consistent. Receiving any one of the treatments that remind respondents about Russian aggression in the region strongly increases threat perception, and are as large as the effect of partisanship. Its effects on anger towards Russia are still positive, but comparatively weaker. Regardless of how it is measured—IDP status, knowing someone who was murdered, or the index of violence exposure—exposure to violence increases anger towards Russia and heightens threat perceptions.




Figure 3: Treatment Effects on Perceptions of Threat and Anger. Top plots include disaggregated treatments, while the bottom plots collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable. Plots on the left side are average treatment effect (ATE), while those on the right side include controls (Kutaisi, conflict-affected, Sakaashvili support, Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending). Based on regressions from Column 1 (no controls) and Columns 3 (with controls) from Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6.




Figure 4: Relationship Between Violence and Perceptions of Threat and Anger. Based on regressions shown in Column 3 (IDP), Column 5 (Known Murder), and Column 6 (Total Exposure) in Table 4 (Russia Threat) and Table 6 (Russia Angry).

### 5.3 Effect of the Treatments and Exposure on Policy Attitudes

How do reminders about Russian aggression (treatments) and exposure to political violence affect key foreign policy attitudes? These attitudes include support for Georgia joining NATO even if Russia threatens it militarily, and recognizing Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence to reduce tensions with Russia.

In Figure 5 we examine the effects of reminders about Russian aggression via the Anger Treatment, Fear Treatment, and Pure Information Treatment relative to the Control Condition on policy attitudes. The right panel of Figure 5 includes controls. Similar to the findings from the effects of the treatments on anger and perceptions of threat (Figure 3), the treatments are not statistically different from each other. In the bottom panel of Figure 5 we collapse the treatments to a single dummy treatment (Any Treat). Receiving any treatment reminding about Russian aggression strongly increases support for joining NATO. This is true regardless of whether the treatments are disaggregated (top panel), or collapse the treatments (bottom panel), or the raw average treatment effects (left panel) or those with controls (right panel). The treatments also influence attitudes on independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While not as large of an effect, the findings are consistent with the treatments causing respondents to support a more hardline foreign policy. Receiving any one of the treatments reduces support for recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In sum, the treatments increase support for a tougher foreign policy stance towards Russia and the breakaway regions.

Figure 6, examines how exposure to violence influences attitudes on foreign policy. The effects here are quite different than those on anger and exposure to violence (Figure 4). Neither IDP status (IDP), knowing someone killed in Abkhazia or South Ossetia (Known Murder), nor an index measure of violence (Total Exposure) have any significant, direct effects on foreign policy attitudes. It also should be noted that these findings differ from others who have found that exposure to violence increases hardline policies, and from our hypotheses.

The findings suggest that reminders of past violence (our treatments) have distinct, and strong effects on policies relative to exposure to violence. Our treatments increase support for a hardline foreign policy, yet exposure to violence, while increase perceptions of threat from and anger towards Russia, do not have a direct effect on policy attitudes. In the subsequent sections we compare the effects of our treatments on IDPs versus non-IDPs, and also how the effects of the treatments and exposure to violence on policy attitudes are mediated by perceptions of threat and anger.




Figure 5: Treatment Effects on Attitudes Towards NATO, Recognize South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Top plots include disaggregated treatments, while the bottom plots collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable. Plots on the left side are average treatment effect (ATE), while those on the right side include controls (Kutaisi, Conflict Affected, Sakaashvili Support, Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending). Based on regressions from Column 1 (no controls) and Columns 3 (with controls) from Tables 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.




Figure 6: Relationship Between Violence on Attitudes Towards NATO, Recognize South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Based on regressions shown in Column 3 (IDP), Column 5 (Known Murder), and Column 6 (Total Exposure) in Table 8 (Georgia NATO), Table 10 (Recognize Abkhazia), and Table 12 (Recognize South Ossetia).

### 5.4 Comparing Treatment Effects of IDPs versus Non-IDPs

Perhaps those exposed to violence responded differently to the treatments relative to those that are not as exposed? To answer this question, in Figure 7 we compare treatment effects (receiving any treatment) for IDPs relative to non-IDPs for both anger and perceptions of threat towards Russia, as well as foreign policy attitudes. Whether looking at anger and perceptions of threat (Russia Threat and Russia Anger) or policy attitudes (Georgia NATO, Recognize Abkhazia, and Recognize South Ossetia), there are no statistical differences in the response of IDPs and non-IDPs to

our treatment. Thus it does not appear that exposure to violence significantly affects the salience of reminding individuals of Russian aggression.




Figure 7: Treatment Effects on IDPs versus non-IDPs. Note it show the effect of receiving any one of the treatments comparing IDPs to non-IDPs. Coefficient results are drawn from Panel B in Table 13.

### 5.5 Mediation Effects

We started off our analysis showing the correlation between anger towards and perceptions of threat from Russia with policy attitudes (Table 2). A key question might be how the treatments and exposure to violence influence foreign policy attitudes via anger and perceptions of threat? In other words, do anger and threat mediate the relationship between our key independent variables (treatments and exposure to violence) and foreign policy attitudes? To test this, we use Imai et al.'s (2010) general approach to mediation.

In Figure 8 we present the results of mediation analysis. The top panel examines the effects of IDP status on policy attitudes (support for joining NATO, and recognizing Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence) mediated via perceptions of threat (top left) and anger (top right). The direct effect is effect of the IDP status on policy outcomes, while the average causal mediation effect (ACME) is the effect of IDP status through anger towards Russia (left) and perceptions of threat (right). The direct effects of the treatment for both threat (left) and anger (right) for policy outcomes are largely zero, echoing the findings from Figure 6, that there is no significant direct relationship between victimization and policy outcomes.

However, the ACME suggests that the effects of victimization on policy preferences operate largely via anger and threat. Increased threat resulting from being an IDP increases support for joining NATO, and reducing support for recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia (top left). The effects of IDP status on anger (top right) largely

match the effects of threat. These findings suggest that the effects of exposure to violence on policy outcomes largely operate through anger and threat, and in doing so, increase support for a hardline foreign policy.

In the bottom plot, we examine the effects of the treatment on policy attitudes mediated via perceptions of threat from Russia (bottom left) and anger (bottom right). In contrast to the effects of exposure to violence (top), the direct effect of receiving any of the treatments significantly increases support for joining NATO, and reduces support for Akbhazia's and South Ossetia's independence. Conversely, the ACME is much smaller, and largely zero.

The mediation findings provide further nuance to how emotions and reminders of past violence influence attitudes.[37] Both exposure to violence and our treatments increase support for hardline policies, yet via different pathways. Exposure to violence increases threat perceptions and anger, and its effect on policy is largely driven via mediation. In contrast, even though our treatments increased perceptions of threat, and to a lesser extent anger, their effect on policy is direct, and largely not mediated via threat or anger. Taken together these findings suggest that exposure to

[37] It is important to note that ACME requires the extra, somewhat strong sequential ignorability assumption. First, the treatment must be random conditional on the observed covariates. This is easily met for the primes, since they are experimentally manipulated, but potentially difficult for the IDP status. The second more difficult assumption is that the values of the mediator (anger and treat) should be as-if randomized conditional on the treatment and observed covariates. Thus the effect of mediation requires the extra assumption that there is no unobserved pretreatment variable that confounds the relationship between anger and threat and the outcome.

violence may indeed create emotional grievances, while reminders about past and current aggression (treatments) operate at a more cognitive level.




Figure 8 Mediation Effects. Top panel looks at the effect of victimization (IDP status) as mediated through perceptions of Russian threat (left), and anger at Russia (right) on attitudes toward NATO, recognition of Abkhazia, and recognition of South Ossetia. Bottom panel looks at the effect of the treatment as mediated through as mediated through perceptions of Russian threat (left), and anger at Russia (right) on attitudes toward NATO, recognition of Abkhazia, and recognition of South Ossetia. All analyses include the following variables in both the first stage and second stage equations (any treatment, IDP status, Kutaisi, conflict-affected, Sakaashvili support, Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending). Direct and average causal mediation effects (ACME) were calculated using 1,000 simulations using the *medeff* package in STATA (Imai et al., 2010).

## Section 7 Conclusion

Using a survey experiment, we examined how exposure to conflict and reminders about past and current aggression influence foreign policy attitudes. We have four key findings. First, we show that anger and threat perceptions are positively related to foreign policy attitudes. Second we show that exposure to violence increases perceptions of threat, and anger towards Russia. Furthermore our treatments—simply reminding respondents about Russian aggression—increase perceptions of threat, and to a lesser extent anger. Third, our treatments further increase support for joining NATO, and decrease support for recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent from Georgia. Finally, our mediation analysis suggests that exposure to violence and reminders of Russian aggression both increase support for hardline policies, albeit through different pathways. Reminders of Russian aggression directly increase support for hardline policies at a more cognitive level. Conversely, exposure to violence increases support for hardline foreign policy via increased anger and threat perceptions (an emotional level).

There are several important implications from our findings. They bring nuance to the recent literature on the effects of exposure to violence. Many scholars have recently written how exposure to violence influences political behavior and attitudes (Hersh 2013, Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014, Bauer et al 2016). We show that exposure to violence can increase anger and perceptions of threat, and in turn, can have an indirect effect (via anger and threat) on policy attitudes. This suggests that the causal chain between exposure to violence and political attitudes travels via emotions. Scholars and policymakers should not ignore

the importance of emotions on political violence and "black-box" the causal process of exposure to violence.

Our experimental findings are equally important. They show that the simply reminding the public about past and current aggression from external rivals can harden foreign policy attitudes. From a policy point of view this is particularly important. Given the importance of intractable conflicts, frozen conflicts, and enduring rivalries that undergird much of the IR literature (Goertz and Diehl 1993, Bar-Tal 2000, Petersen 2002), we provide two mechanisms through which these conflicts can endure. Hardline leaders and political entrepreneurs can use past conflicts as a rallying cry to strengthen their position and increase support for tougher foreign policies towards adversaries. Reminding the public of more powerful adversaries actions leads to increased feelings threat and anger, which further can increase support for a more confrontation foreign policy. Even in a militarily weak state such as Georgia, these feelings do not increase support for actions that may diffuse the situation. Rather they spur a more confrontational foreign policy and taking actions that can ameliorate the threat (NATO). Thus providing a mechanism for how the continuation of the conflict.

Future research should disentangle the separate effects of emotions and exposure to violence on conflict attitudes and behavior. It should also pay attention to how leaders use these appeals strategically for their own benefits. Leaders' strategic use of appeals to garner support and sway foreign policy is a crucial next step to better understanding conflicts, and potentially finding strategies to bring them to a peaceful resolution.

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## ONLINE APPENDIX

## TABLES

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat |
| Pure Information Treatment | 0.06** | 0.06** | 0.06** | 0.08*** | 0.06** | 0.06** | 0.06** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Anger Treatment | 0.05* | 0.05* | 0.05* | 0.05 | 0.05* | 0.05* | 0.05* |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Fear Treatment | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.05* | 0.06* | 0.05* | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Kutaisi | | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.05 |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| IDP | | 0.10*** | 0.12*** | 0.10** | | | |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.06** | 0.06** | 0.06** | 0.06** | 0.07*** |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | 0.11** | | | |
| | | | | (0.05) | | | |
| Honor | | | | -0.02 | | | |
| | | | | (0.09) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | 0.10*** | | |
| | | | | | (0.04) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | 0.23*** | |
| | | | | | | (0.08) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.45*** |
| | | | | | | | (0.10) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.17 |
| | | | | | | | (0.10) |
| Observations | 1129 | 1129 | 937 | 813 | 928 | 937 | 937 |
| $R^2$ | 0.006 | 0.049 | 0.082 | 0.084 | 0.064 | 0.075 | 0.084 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
$^{*}$ $p < .10$, $^{**}$ $p < .05$, $^{***}$ $p < .01$

Table 3: Dependent Variable: How much of a threat is Russia (OLS)?

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat |
| Any Treatment | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.03) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) |
| Kutaisi | | -0.04 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.04 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.04) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) |
| IDP | | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.10** (0.04) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | 0.11** (0.05) | | | |
| Honor | | | | -0.02 (0.09) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | 0.10*** (0.04) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | 0.23*** (0.08) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.45*** (0.10) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.17 (0.10) |
| Observations | 1129 | 1129 | 937 | 813 | 928 | 937 | 937 |
| $R^2$ | 0.005 | 0.049 | 0.082 | 0.082 | 0.064 | 0.075 | 0.084 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4 Dependent Variable: How much of a threat is Russia (OLS)? Note it collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry |
| Pure Information Treatment | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Anger Treatment | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Fear Treatment | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Kutaisi | | -0.08** (0.03) | -0.09** (0.03) | -0.08** (0.04) | -0.11*** (0.03) | -0.10*** (0.03) | -0.11*** (0.03) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) |
| IDP | | 0.14*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | 0.04 (0.05) | | | |
| Honor | | | | 0.11 (0.07) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | 0.11*** (0.03) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | 0.29*** (0.07) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.46*** (0.14) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.28*** (0.09) |
| Observations | 1152 | 1152 | 950 | 823 | 941 | 950 | 950 |
| $R^2$ | 0.002 | 0.108 | 0.135 | 0.144 | 0.101 | 0.137 | 0.141 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 5: Dependent Variable: How angry do Russia's actions in the region make you (OLS)?

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Russia Angry |
| Any Treatment | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Kutaisi | | -0.08** (0.03) | -0.09** (0.03) | -0.08** (0.04) | -0.11*** (0.03) | -0.10*** (0.03) | -0.11*** (0.03) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) |
| IDP | | 0.14*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | 0.04 (0.05) | | | |
| Honor | | | | 0.11 (0.07) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | 0.11*** (0.03) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | 0.29*** (0.07) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.46*** (0.14) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.28*** (0.09) |
| Observations | 1152 | 1152 | 950 | 823 | 941 | 950 | 950 |
| $R^2$ | 0.001 | 0.107 | 0.135 | 0.144 | 0.101 | 0.137 | 0.141 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 6: Dependent Variable: How angry do Russia's actions in the region make you (OLS)? Note it collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO |
| Pure Information Treatment | 0.06** (0.03) | 0.06** (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) |
| Anger Treatment | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.02) | 0.04 (0.02) | 0.05* (0.02) | 0.04* (0.02) | 0.04 (0.02) | 0.04* (0.02) |
| Fear Treatment | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.05* (0.03) |
| Kutaisi | | -0.11** (0.04) | -0.11** (0.05) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.12*** (0.04) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.04 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.07 (0.04) |
| IDP | | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.05* (0.02) | 0.05* (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05* (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | -0.08 (0.06) | | | |
| Honor | | | | -0.10 (0.08) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | 0.01 (0.04) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | -0.04 (0.08) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.02 (0.14) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | -0.08 (0.10) |
| Observations | 955 | 955 | 799 | 711 | 791 | 799 | 799 |
| $R^2$ | 0.007 | 0.030 | 0.035 | 0.052 | 0.037 | 0.036 | 0.037 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
$^{*}$ $p < .10$, $^{**}$ $p < .05$, $^{***}$ $p < .01$

Table 7: Dependent Variable: Georgia should join NATO (Disagree-Agree) (OLS).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO |
| Any Treatment | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) |
| Kutaisi | | -0.11** (0.04) | -0.11** (0.05) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.12*** (0.04) | -0.12*** (0.04) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.04 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.07 (0.04) |
| IDP | | 0.01 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05* (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.05** (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | -0.08 (0.06) | | | |
| Honor | | | | -0.10 (0.08) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | 0.02 (0.04) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | -0.04 (0.08) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.02 (0.13) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | -0.08 (0.10) |
| Observations | 955 | 955 | 799 | 711 | 791 | 799 | 799 |
| $R^2$ | 0.006 | 0.029 | 0.034 | 0.051 | 0.036 | 0.034 | 0.036 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 8: Dependent Variable: Georgia should join NATO (Disagree-Agree) (OLS).
Note it collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia |
| Pure Information Treatment | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Anger Treatment | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Fear Treatment | -0.05** (0.02) | -0.05** (0.02) | -0.05** (0.02) | -0.06** (0.02) | -0.05** (0.02) | -0.05** (0.02) | -0.05** (0.02) |
| Kutaisi | | 0.11*** (0.04) | 0.13*** (0.04) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) |
| IDP | | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.03) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.03* (0.02) | 0.03** (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | 0.08* (0.04) | | | |
| Honor | | | | -0.05 (0.06) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | -0.03 (0.03) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | -0.02 (0.07) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.02 (0.11) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | -0.04 (0.09) |
| Observations | 1140 | 1139 | 943 | 816 | 934 | 943 | 943 |
| $R^2$ | 0.005 | 0.054 | 0.090 | 0.095 | 0.093 | 0.090 | 0.091 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
$^{*}$ $p < .10$, $^{**}$ $p < .05$, $^{***}$ $p < .01$

Table 9: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize Abkhazia's independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia |
| Any Treatment | -0.03* | -0.03* | -0.03* | -0.03* | -0.03* | -0.03* | -0.03* |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Kutaisi | | 0.12*** | 0.13*** | 0.11*** | 0.13*** | 0.13*** | 0.13*** |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| IDP | | -0.02 | -0.00 | -0.02 | | | |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.03* | 0.03* | 0.03* | 0.03* | 0.03** |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | 0.08* | | | |
| | | | | (0.04) | | | |
| Honor | | | | -0.05 | | | |
| | | | | (0.06) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | -0.03 | | |
| | | | | | (0.03) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | -0.02 | |
| | | | | | | (0.07) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.02 |
| | | | | | | | (0.11) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | -0.05 |
| | | | | | | | (0.09) |
| Observations | 1140 | 1139 | 943 | 816 | 934 | 943 | 943 |
| $R^2$ | 0.003 | 0.053 | 0.087 | 0.091 | 0.091 | 0.087 | 0.088 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 10: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize Abkhazia's independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS). Note it collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia |
| Pure Information Treatment | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| Anger Treatment | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) |
| Fear Treatment | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.05* (0.03) | -0.07** (0.03) | -0.05* (0.03) | -0.05* (0.03) | -0.05* (0.03) |
| Kutaisi | | 0.09** (0.04) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.10*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) |
| IDP | | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Stress | | | | 0.02 (0.05) | | | |
| Honor | | | | 0.03 (0.09) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | -0.02 (0.02) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | -0.02 (0.05) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | 0.02 (0.11) |
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | -0.04 (0.07) |
| Observations | 1139 | 1139 | 943 | 816 | 934 | 943 | 943 |
| $R^2$ | 0.004 | 0.032 | 0.064 | 0.074 | 0.065 | 0.063 | 0.064 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
$^{*}$ $p < .10$, $^{**}$ $p < .05$, $^{***}$ $p < .01$

Table 11: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize South Ossetia's independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia |
| Any Treatment | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03* | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Kutaisi | | 0.11*** | 0.12*** | 0.11*** | 0.13*** | 0.13*** | 0.13*** |
| | | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Conflict Affected Area | | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| IDP | | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.03 | | | |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | | | |
| Saakashvili Support | | | 0.03* | 0.03* | 0.03* | 0.03* | 0.03* |
| | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Stress | | | | 0.04 | | | |
| | | | | (0.04) | | | |
| Honor | | | | -0.04 | | | |
| | | | | (0.06) | | | |
| Knew Someone Murdered | | | | | -0.03 | | |
| | | | | | (0.02) | | |
| Total War Exposure | | | | | | -0.03 | |
| | | | | | | (0.06) | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | | | | | | | -0.00 |
| | | | | | | | (0.11) |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abkhazia Exposure | | | | | | | -0.04 (0.08) |
| Observations | 1139 | 1138 | 942 | 815 | 933 | 942 | 942 |
| $R^2$ | 0.002 | 0.060 | 0.098 | 0.107 | 0.102 | 0.098 | 0.098 |
| Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
$^{*}$ $p < .10$, $^{**}$ $p < .05$, $^{***}$ $p < .01$

Table 12: Dependent Variable: To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize South Ossetia's independence (Disagree-Agree) (OLS). Note it collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable (Any Treatment).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia |
| Pure Information Treatment | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.11** (0.05) | 0.03 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Anger Treatment | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.04 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.01 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.02) |
| Fear Treatment | 0.09** (0.04) | 0.02 (0.03) | 0.07* (0.04) | 0.01 (0.03) | 0.07 (0.04) | 0.05* (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.06** (0.03) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.06** (0.03) |
| Observations | 415 | 714 | 423 | 729 | 347 | 608 | 418 | 720 | 421 | 718 |
| $R^2$ | 0.015 | 0.004 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.019 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.012 | 0.002 | 0.012 |

Standard errors in parentheses
Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Panel A

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia is a Threat | Russia is a Threat | Russia Angry | Russia Angry | Georgia Join NATO | Georgia Join NATO | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize South Ossetia | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize Abkhazia |
| Any Treatment | 0.07** (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.07* (0.04) | 0.04 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.02 (0.03) | -0.04* (0.02) |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observations | 415 | 714 | 423 | 729 | 347 | 608 | 418 | 720 | 421 | 718 |
| $R^2$ | 0.014 | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.010 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.005 |

Standard errors in parentheses
Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
$^{*}$ $p < .10$, $^{**}$ $p < .05$, $^{***}$ $p < .01$

Panel B

Table 13: Comparing treatment effects for IDPs (columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9) versus non-IDPs. In Panel A the treatments are disaggregated, while Panel B collapses all three treatments into a single dummy variable.

## Online Appendix

### A.1 Sampling Design

The target population was broken down into three separate geographic strata, with an aim to sample approximately an equal number of respondents across the following three regions: Tblisi, Kutaisi, and conflict-affected areas (those affected by the 2008 Russo-Georgian War). Conflict-affected areas include the Kaspi municipality, Gori municipality, Kareli municipality, Senaki municipality, Khobi municipality, Zugdidi municipality, Poti municipality and Tserovani IDP settlement. In each of the three geographic areas (Tbilisi, Kutasi and conflict-affected), we also sub-divided each stratum into those that had compact IDP settlements (i.e., areas exclusively reserved for IDPs), and non-IDP specific areas. This yields six strata: 1) Tbilisi non-IDP; 2) Tbilisi IDP; 3) Kutaisi non-IDP; 4) Kutaisi IDP; 5) conflict-affected non-IDP; and 6) conflict-affected IDP. We oversampled IDPs 15 times higher than their share of the respective target population within each geographic stratum. In each of the three geographic strata we targeted 500 complete interviews and the sample size was based on expected response rate[38] Each strata was further sub-stratified by settlement type (urban or rural), and the sample was divided proportionally to the

[38] Expected response rates were taken from the latest CRRC surveys conducted in the relevant areas. However, the actual response rate was lower than expected (especially in Tbilisi) and we could not reach the target response 500 in any of the three geographic strata.

urban/rural population within each strata. See Figure 1 for a geographic distribution of our sample.




Figure A.1: Sampling Map

The primary sampling unit (PSU) was at the voting precinct-level. Voting precincts were randomly selected within each stratum, with equal probability of selection within each substratum. In each PSU 32 households were sampled by interviewers following a random walk. Interviews were instructions (see details in Annex 1). The respondents in each sampled household were selected using Kish Tables.[39] In the event that the interviewers failed to make contact with the household, or made contact with the household but failed to make contact with the selected household member, they returned for a second, and then, if necessary, for a third contact attempt before classifying the interview attempt as a non-response. These repeated contact attempts were necessary in order to minimize selection bias for demographic groups that are more easily located at home (e.g., the elderly, the unemployed, etc.). Ninety-five percent of completed interviews were achieved at the first attempt. Overall distribution of the sample is summarized in table 1.

[39] Kish, Leslie (September 1949), "A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection within the Household", Journal of the American Statistical Association 44 (247): 380–387. For more accessible description of this method please see:

Using the AAPOR[40] standard for determining response rate, i.e. an interview in which at least 50% of the questions had valid answers was counted as a full response. Table 1 summarizes response rates per stratum. It shows that the overall response rate was 52%, and provides the distribution of responses across the three interview attempts in each stratum.

| **Stratum** | **Interview attempts** | **Completed interviews** | | | | **Response rate** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Total | Attempt 1 | Attempt 2 | Attempt 3 | |
| Tbilisi Non-IDP | 768 | 192 | 165 | 22 | 5 | 25% |
| Tbilisi IDP | 253 | 101 | 81 | 16 | 4 | 40% |
| Kutaisi Non-IDP | 559 | 406 | 246 | 142 | 18 | 73% |
| Kutaisi IDP | 106 | 78 | 57 | 17 | 4 | 74% |
| Conflict-affected areas Non-IDP | 256 | 185 | 151 | 32 | 2 | 72% |
| Conflict affected area- IDP | 391 | 258 | 215 | 35 | 8 | 66% |
| Total | 2,333 | 1,220 | 915 | 264 | 41 | 52% |

Table A.1: Response Rates

[40] AAPOR response definitions are available at  Please see also:

## A.2 Measurement and Pre-registered Hypotheses

### A.2.1 Treatments and Measurement of Variables/ Survey Questions

### Treatments

1. [No Information/Control Condition]

2. Pure Information Treatment

   "*Georgia faces many important foreign policy choices going forward including its relationship with the European Union, United States, and perhaps most importantly Russia. Russia and Georgia have had disagreements over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and recent Russian actions in Ukraine--Donbas and Crimea further highlight tensions."*

3. Anger Treatment

   "*Georgia faces many important foreign policy choices going forward including its relationship with the European Union, United States, and perhaps most importantly Russia. Russia and Georgia have had disagreements over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and recent Russian actions in Ukraine--Donbas and Crimea further highlight tensions. We are interested in your feelings about Russia's past and current actions. Specifically, we are interested in what makes you most ANGRY about Russia's foreign policy actions. Please describe and tell us what most makes you ANGRY about Russia's actions. Please be as detailed and specific as possible."*

4. Fear Treatment

   "*Georgia faces many important foreign policy choices going forward including its relationship with the European Union, United States, and perhaps most importantly Russia. Russia and Georgia have had disagreements over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and recent Russian actions in Ukraine--Donbas and Crimea further highlight tensions.. We are interested in your feelings about Russia's past and current actions. Specifically, we are interested in what makes you most AFRAID about Russia's foreign policy actions. Please describe and tell us what most makes you AFRAID about Russia's actions. Please be as detailed and specific as possible."*

### Measurement of Variables

- **IDP**- 1 if an individual has official status as an IDP, 0 if not
- **Kutaisi**- 1 if a respondent lives in the Kutaisi, 0 if not

- **Conflict Affected Area**- 1 if a respondent lives in a conflict affected area, 0 if otherwise
- **Total War Exposure**- Sum of personal exposure of all instances below from conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia rescaled to lie between 0 and 1
  - Witnessed violence
  - Assaulted
  - Know Someone Murdered
  - Extorted
  - House confiscated
  - Suffered property damage
  - Displaced
- **South Ossetia Exposure**- Degree of Total War Exposure stemming from South Ossetia)
- **Abkhazia Exposure**- Degree of Total War Exposure stemming from Abkhazia
- **Know Someone Murdered** -1 if the respondent Know Someone Murdered in conflicts in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, 0 otherwise
- **Stress**- Drawn from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventor (Marteau and Bekker 1992) (*CITE), rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 ($\alpha$=0.77)
  - *A number of statements which have used to describe themselves are given below. Listen to each statement and tell us how you feel right now, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. (Not at All to Very Much)*

1. I feel calm*
2. I am tense
3. I am upset
4. I am relaxed*
5. I feel content*
6. I am worried

- *Revers Scored

- **Honor**- Summative scale of the 7 following statements, rescaled to lie between 0 to 1 ($\alpha$=0.86). Adapted from (Mosquera et al. 2002)
  - *Please rate the extent behaving or having a reputation as described in each item would damage how you felt about yourself (Not at All to Very Much)*

1. Your family having a bad reputation
2. Not keeping your "word"
3. You don't show a guest proper hospitality
4. Not defending yourself when others insult you
5. Having female relatives who are known to be "loose" or "easy"
6. Letting others insult your family
7. Not being loyal to one's head of household /family

- **Saakashvili Support**- 1 if the respondent chose statement A), 0 if they chose Statement B.
  - Statement A) Saakashvili was not perfect, but overall he was a good leader
  - Statement B) Saakashvili had some success, but overall he was a bad leader
- **Education**-Highest achieved level of education (1-8)
  1. No primary education.

2. Primary education (either complete or incomplete)
3. Incomplete secondary education
4. Completed secondary education
5. Secondary technical education.
6. Incomplete higher education.
7. Completed higher education (BA, MA, or *Specialist* degree)
8. Post-graduate degree

- **Household Spending**- Monthly household spending in Georgian Lari (1-8)
- Up to 150 GEL
- 151-260GEL
- 261-400GEL
- 401-800GEL
- 801-1200GEL
- 1201-1600GEL
- More than 1600GEL

**Dependent Variables**

- **Russia is a Threat** (1-5)
- How much of a threat, if at all, is Russia to Georgia?
  1. Minor Threat
  2. Moderate Threat
  3. Serious Threat
  4. Very Serious Threat
  5. Extremely Serious threat
- **Russia Angry** (1-5)
- How angry do Russia's actions in the region make you?

1. Not Angry at All
2. A Little Angry
3. Angry
4. Very Angry
5. Extremely Angry

- **Georgia Should Join NATO** (1-5)
- Georgia should join NATO even if Russia threatens it militarily

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree a Little
3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4. Agree a Little
5. Agree Strongly

- **Recognize South Ossetia** (1-5)
- To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize South Ossetia's independence from Georgia

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree a Little
3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4. Agree a Little

5. Agree Strongly

- **Recognize Abkhazia** (1-5)
- To reduce tensions with Russia, Georgia should recognize Abkhazia's independence from Georgia
- Disagree Strongly
- Disagree a Little
- Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Agree a Little
- Agree Strongly

### A.2.2 Pre-Registered Hypotheses

These stem from EGAP # 20151107AA[41]

1. Anger and Fear will have distinct effects from each other and from the Control on foreign policy attitudes towards Russia
   1. Anger will lead to favoring a harder-line policy with Russia--support for joining more pro-Western groups, and helping Ukraine relative to Control and Informational treatment.
   2. Fear will have the opposite effect, leading respondents to be less willing to challenge Russian foreign policy, and seek more accommodation.
2. Anger and Fear will have distinct effects from each other and distinct from the Control and Informational treatment on foreign policy attitudes towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia
   1. Anger will lead to favoring a harder-line policy Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and less in favor of reconciliation or normalization of relations
   2. Fear will have the opposite effect, leading those to be more in favor of reconciliation or normalization of relations

**a. Observational/non Experimental Hypotheses**

1. Respondents who have been victims/IDPs will favor a more muscular policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia relative to those that are not
2. Controlling for IDP status, respondents living closer to Abkhazia/South Ossetia will be more cautious in their dealings with South Abkhazia/South Ossetia, since they have to bear the costs of any future conflict (i.e. O3 and O4 are not mutually exclusive)
3. Those who score higher on the Honor Scale will support a tougher foreign policy towards Russia
4. Those who score higher on the Honor Scale will support a tougher policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia
5. Pro-Western/Saakashvili-supporters will support a tougher foreign policy towards Russia

[41] These numbers on the hypotheses differ slightly from the EGAP since we have omitted the pre-registered hypotheses from a separate survey experiment that was run as part of the full survey.

## A.3 Randomization Checks

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (7) | | (8) | | | |
| | | | | | | Household Spending | | Married | | | | Total War Exposure | | Know Someone Murdered | | | |
| | | Male | | Respondent's Age | | | | | Education | | | | | | | | |
| Pure Information Treatment | | 0.01 | | 0.84 | | 0.19 | | 0.01 | 0.11 | | | 0.01 | | 0.02 | | | |
| | | (0.04) | | (1.45) | | (0.12) | | (0.04) | | (0.11) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) | | | |
| Anger Treatment | -0.04 | | | -0.77 | | 0.15 | | -0.01 | | 0.08 | | -0.00 | | -0.02 | | | |
| | | (0.0 | | (1.44) | | (0.12) | | (0.0 | | (0.1 | | (0.0 | | (0.0 | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 4) | | | | | | 4) | | 1) | | | 2) | | 2) | | | |
| *50.* | Fear Treatment | 0.02 | | *51.* | -1.48 | *52.* | 0.05 | *53.* | -0.02 | *54.* | -0.09 | *55.* | *56.* | 0.01 | *57.* | -0.01 | | |
| | | *58.* | (0.04) | *59.* | (1.44) | *60.* | (0.12) | *61.* | (0.04) | *62.* | (0.11) | *63.* | *64.* | (0.02) | *65.* | (0.02) | | |
| *66.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *67.* | Observations | *68.* | 1222 | *69.* | 1222 | 1116 | | *70.* | 1222 | *71.* | 1222 | *72.* | *73.* | 1220 | *74.* | 1205 | | | |
| *75.* | $R^2$ | *76.* | 0.0002 | *77.* | 0.002 | *78.* | 0.0003 | *79.* | 0.0000 | *80.* | 0.003 | *81.* | *82.* | 0.001 | 0.003 | | | | |
| *83.* | F-statistic | *84.* | 0.72 | 85. | 0.94 | *86.* | 1.03 | *87.* | 0.15 | *88.* | 1.19 | 0.22 | *89.* | 0.37 | *90.* | 1.25 | | | |
| *91.* | Prob>F | 92. | 0.54 | *93.* | 0.42 | *94.* | 0.38 | *95.* | 0.93 | *96.* | 0.31 | *97.* | *98.* | 0.77 | *99.* | 0.29 | | | |
| *100.* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *101.* | Standard errors in parentheses<br>* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table A.3: Randomization Checks

## A.4. Additional Results

| | Conflict Affected Area | IDP | Know Someone Murdered | South Ossetia Exposure | Abkhazia Exposure | Total War Exposure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict Affected Area | 1.00 | | | | | |
| IDP | 0.35 | 1.00 | | | | |
| Know Someone Murdered | 0.01 | 0.23 | 1.00 | | | |
| South Ossetia Exposure | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0.09 | 1.00 | | |
| Abkhazia Exposure | -0.01 | 0.59 | 0.48 | -0.14 | 1.00 | |
| Total War Exposure | 0.25 | 0.76 | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.76 | 1.00 |

Table A.4.1: Correlation between different measures of exposure to violence.

| | Russia is a Threat | Russia Angry | Georgia Join NATO | Recognize Abkhazia | Recognize South Ossetia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russia is a Threat | 1.00 | | | | |
| Russia Angry | 0.64 | 1.00 | | | |
| Georgia Join NATO | 0.27 | 0.25 | 1.00 | | |
| Recognize Abkhazia | -0.13 | -0.25 | -0.17 | 1.00 | |
| Recognize South Ossetia | -0.14 | -0.28 | -0.17 | 0.942 | 1.00 |

Table A.4.2: Correlations between all of the dependent variables

| | (1) Russia is a Threat | (2) Russia Angry | (3) Georgia Join NATO | (4) Recognize Abkhazia | (5) Recognize South Ossetia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Any Treatment | 0.21** | 0.12 | 0.23*** | -0.12 | -0.15* |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Kutaisi | -0.12 | -0.34** | -0.45*** | 0.64*** | 0.64*** |
| | (0.18) | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
| Conflict Affected Area | 0.16 | 0.05 | -0.14 | 0.12 | 0.01 |
| | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.23) | (0.24) |
| IDP | 0.40** | 0.53*** | -0.03 | -0.30 | -0.31 |
| | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.19) | (0.20) |
| Saakashvili Support | 0.24** | 0.26*** | 0.18** | 0.16 | 0.14 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Stress | 0.51** | 0.18 | -0.25 | 0.50* | 0.34 |
| | (0.22) | (0.21) | (0.23) | (0.26) | (0.28) |
| Honor | -0.04 | 0.48 | -0.39 | -0.30 | -0.19 |
| | (0.35) | (0.30) | (0.30) | (0.33) | (0.35) |
| Controls? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 813.00 | 823.00 | 711.00 | 816.00 | 815.00 |
| *Pseudo-$R^2$* | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.07 |

Standard errors in parentheses
Controls include Age, Sex, Marital Status, Education, and Monthly Household Spending. Note standard errors clustered at the voting precinct-level (PSU).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A.4.3: Ordered Probit results